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Abstract 
 
This paper discusses the need for informed decision making with respect to the management of the risks 
Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) operations present to people and property on the ground. In the absence of a 
wealth of experience in the hazards of UAS operations, an understanding of the risks can be gained through a 
formal risk analysis.  This paper proposes the development of new risk analysis tools as a means for ensuring 
risk-informed decision making.  The paper provides an introduction to the risk management of UAS operations 
over inhabited areas and presents an argument which establishes the need for an objective understanding of the 
risks.  The development of formal risk analysis tools is then discussed.  A simple casualty expectation model is 
presented and is applied to the example case-study scenario of a generic Medium Altitude, Long Endurance 
(MALE) UAS on approach to Royal Australia Air Force (RAAF) Base Edinburgh.  A brief evaluation of the 
results from the analysis is provided; illustrating how a formal risk analysis can be used to inform practical 
decision making. The paper concludes by providing a summary on the direction of the program of research and 
the key points made.  
 
Biography 
 
Reece Clothier is a PhD student at the Australian Research Centre for Aerospace Automation (ARCAA), 
Queensland University of Technology (QUT). He graduated from his Bachelor of Engineering (Aerospace 
Avionics) at QUT in 2004 with first class honours and was awarded the QUT Medal.  In his final year of 
undergraduate study, Reece was responsible for the development of a UAV flight management and control 
system and the management of the undergraduate UAV development project, which culminated in a number of 
successful flight trials.  In 2005, Reece commenced his PhD research in the area of UAS and risk management 
and in 2006 was awarded the Higher Degree Research Student of the Year for the Faculty of Built Environment 
and Engineering.  Over the last year Reece has worked on a number of industry projects and continues an active 
involvement in the UAV development project at QUT. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Casualty Risk Analysis For Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) Operations Over Inhabited Areas 
AIAC12 – Twelfth Australian International Aerospace Congress, 
2nd Australasian Unmanned Air Vehicles Conference, 19 – 22 March 2007 
Copyright © 2006 by R. Clothier, Queensland University of Technology 
Introduction 
 
Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) will play a 
significant role in the future of aviation.  Already 
these systems have demonstrated highly desirable 
capabilities in a wide range of applications.  The 
number of potential applications will continue to 
increase with ongoing advancements in technology, 
with increasing operational experience and a 
growing awareness of UAS capabilities.  
Subsequently, there is an increasing demand for 
UAS access to the National Airspace System 
(NAS) and for operations over populated areas. 
The operation of UAS within the NAS 
presents a hazard to other airspace users and people 
and property on the ground, therefore management 
strategies need to be developed to ensure that the 
risks attributed to these hazards are managed to 
acceptable levels.  For UAS, the de facto 
benchmark for acceptability is that demonstrated 
by conventional human-piloted aviation [1].  
For conventional human-piloted aviation, risk 
management strategies have taken the form of a 
prescriptive body of regulations.  There is a great 
deal of heritage in these regulations which have 
evolved over a century of experience in the hazards 
of human-piloted aviation.  This approach can be 
described as a ‘tombstone policy’, where the 
lessons learned from mishaps are progressively 
incorporated into the regulation of the hazardous 
activity.  However, today’s increasingly risk-aware 
and risk-adverse society [2] are unlikely to accept 
such a reactive approach to the development of a 
risk management framework for UAS.  
Rather than develop a new risk management 
framework, safety regulators propose to adapt the 
existing risk management framework developed for 
conventional human-piloted aviation and apply it to 
UAS [1, 3].  However, UAS are not conventional 
aircraft and there are a number of unique aspects in 
the UAS risk management paradigm which should 
be objectively considered before further 
development of a risk management framework 
(definition of a new framework or the application 
of the existing framework) takes place.  Some of 
these unique aspects include: 
1. Technological – new or complex systems and 
architectures e.g. unique platforms/airframes, 
presence of a communications link, artificial 
intelligence, automation. 
2. Performance – differences in the performance 
and capability of the airborne system e.g. 
endurance, climb and turn rates etc. 
3. Operations – unique operations and 
operational concepts e.g. flying into hurricanes 
for meteorological data collection, extreme 
long endurance or high altitude missions, 
independence of smaller or rotorcraft UAS 
from aerodromes etc. 
4. Human – unique roles and behaviours of 
personnel e.g. complexity of operational roles, 
crew resource management, human machine 
interface issues, personnel attitudes towards 
safety and procedures (lack of “shared 
fate”[4]) etc. 
5. Sociological – society’s response towards 
UAS e.g. society’s perceptions of the risks, 
acceptability of the risks, visibility of the 
benefits etc. 
6. Market Drivers – unique commercial drivers 
and economic tradeoffs behind the operation of 
UAS e.g. the concept of expendable systems, 
attrition rate versus cost etc.  
7. Integration – the interaction of a new aviation 
concept within the existing airspace system 
designed from the outset to meet the needs of 
conventional human-piloted aviation [5], e.g. 
rules of the air, flight rules, communications 
with ATC, airspace classifications, air routes 
etc. 
There are many more unique aspects of the 
UAS risk management paradigm not directly 
related to the management of safety related risks 
which are not listed above (e.g. those related to 
efficiency of the management etc).  
All of the unique aspects listed above will have 
an impact on the risks presented by UAS and/or the 
effectiveness of potential management strategies.  
As such, a comprehensive knowledge of the UAS 
risk paradigm and its many unique aspects is 
necessary to make effective risk management 
decisions.  Currently, the UAS community lacks 
the objective knowledge of the UAS risk paradigm 
necessary to support effective decision making.  
Uncertainty in the current level of knowledge has 
led to the promulgation of a precautionary 
philosophy.  A common view is that it is “better to 
be safe than sorry”, however the underlying lack of 
objective knowledge with respect to the risks has a 
significant impact on the capability, confidence and 
acceptance of UAS technologies, not to mention 
the commercial viability of a UAS industry (e.g. 
over regulation).  On the flipside, the current lack 
of objective knowledge with respect to the risks 
impedes the ability of decision makers to verify 
that the precautionary measures taken are indeed 
rigorous enough.  Addressing the lack of objective 
knowledge with respect to these risks is perhaps 
one of the most significant challenges currently 
facing the UAS industry. 
The objective of this paper is to emphasise the 
importance of effective risk-informed decision 
making with respect to the primary UAS safety 
hazard of a discontinuance of flight over a 
populated area.  The paper proposes the 
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development of risk assessment tools to aid such 
decision making.  To illustrate the importance of 
these tools, a simple risk model is presented and 
applied to the case-study scenario of a UAS on 
approach to Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) 
Base Edinburgh.  RAAF Base Edinburgh was 
chosen for the case-study scenario as it has been 
used as the base of operations for a number of UAS 
trials.  The paper concludes by discussing the 
challenges facing the development and application 
of formal risk assessment tools. 
 
 
The Risks To People And Property On 
The Ground 
 
The primary hazards due to the operation of UAS 
are a midair collision with an inhabited aircraft or a 
discontinuance of safe flight over a populated 
region.  The former of which is the principal driver 
for the definition of rules and regulations 
concerning the level of integration a UAS has 
within the existing NAS.  Regulations pertaining to 
the operation of UAS due to the hazard of midair 
collision are not considered in this paper.  The risks 
to people and property on the ground due to the 
hazard of a discontinuance of flight form the basis 
for standards and regulations pertaining to the 
airworthiness of the system [5] and these risks are 
the focus of this research. 
Currently, UAS exhibit mishap rates of up to 
two orders of magnitude greater than that exhibited 
by conventional human-piloted aircraft [6, 7].  A 
major factor contributing to these high rates is the 
low reliability of the system (which encompasses 
the airborne platform, communications links and 
ground control elements) [5-7].  The limited 
mishap data available for UAS also cites human 
factors, poor maintenance and operational 
procedures as other significant contributing factors 
[7-9].  In summary, UAS currently do not 
demonstrate the same levels of airworthiness which 
are currently exhibited by conventional aircraft and 
it is the general belief that the resulting high 
mishap rate presents an unacceptable level of risk 
to people and property on the ground.  The 
overarching goal is for UAS to demonstrate an 
Equivalent Level Of Safety (ELOS) to that of 
conventional human-piloted aircraft [1].  Until this 
can be achieved, UAS will continue to be subjected 
to precautionary restrictions.   
In the absence of prescriptive regulations, the 
risks of discontinued flight are managed by placing 
restrictions on the nature of the territories a UAS is 
permitted to over-fly and/or mandating the carriage 
of technology-based mitigation systems not 
currently prescribed for conventional human-
piloted aviation (e.g. parachute systems).  
Operational restrictions include preventing the over 
flight of ‘populated’ regions and/or placing 
restrictions on the altitude of operations [10].  UAS 
may also be required to employ mitigation 
technologies such as flight termination systems or 
automatic recovery systems 1 [10]. 
 
Current Management of the Hazard of 
Discontinued Flight 
 
The Australian Civil Aviation Safety Authority 
(CASA) has adopted a “risk management 
approach” [10, 11] to the regulation of UAS 
operations within the Australian NAS.  Under this 
approach, the level of regulation mandated is 
proportional to the perceived level of risks the 
system and operation present.   
CASA has defined requirements on the 
operation of a UAS in Part 101 of the Civil 
Aviation Safety Regulations (CASR) [12] and has 
published guidance material on how operational 
approval can be obtained in Advisory Circular 
AC101-1(0) [10].  Limited guidance on the safe 
design and maintenance of large UAS as well as 
the licensing and training of personnel is provided.  
This guidance is not prescriptive, with the rigour of 
its scrutiny only being determined by the perceived 
risks in the operation.  Additionally and currently, 
there are no prescriptive standards for the design of 
UAS.  In relation to discontinued flight, CASR 
101.280 states that: 
 
“ A person must not operate a UAV that is not a 
certificated UAV over a populous area at a height 
less than the height from which, if any of its 
components fails, it would be able to clear the 
area. 
 
Without the approval of CASA, a person must not 
operate a certificated UAV over a populous area at 
a height less than the height from which, if any of 
its components fails, it would be able to clear the 
area.” 
(CASR 101.280)…[12] 
 
where an area is considered a populous area if: 
 
“…the area has a sufficient density of population 
for some aspect of the operation, or some event 
that might happen during the operation (in 
particular, a fault in, or failure of, the aircraft or 
rocket) to pose an unreasonable risk to the life, 
safety or property of somebody who is in the area 
but is not connected with the operation.” 
 
(CASR 101.025) [Emphasis added]…[12] 
                                                 
1
 According to AC101-1(0) [10] an automatic 
recovery system is defined as a system which 
provides recovery to a predetermined recovery 
area.  
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There is much ambiguity in these regulations, 
with some instances of which indicated in bold 
above.  Under the current risk management 
approach, it is the responsibility of the individual 
UAS operator to provide justification, on a case-
by-case basis, that the risks of an intended UAS 
operation are managed to an acceptable level.  
However, the acceptability of these risks will be at 
the subjective discretion of the safety authority, 
who will typically adopt a ‘precautionary’ [13] risk 
management philosophy.  This philosophy is 
protective and politically defensible [13] but can 
come at significant expense to the public and UAS 
industry.  CASA acknowledges this situation by 
stating that mandated safety requirements may 
result in ‘penalties’ on the operator/manufacturer in 
terms of reduced capacity for payload, and/or an 
increase in the cost, weight and complexity of the 
systems [10].  However, the regulatory approach 
adopted by CASA is receptive; affording the UAS 
operator greater flexibility in the range of strategies 
they can employ to establish the safety case for the 
intended operation. 
The precautionary principle has been applied 
with much more vigour by other aviation safety 
regulators, including the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA).  The FAA currently 
requires that all civil/commercial UAS operations 
obtain a special certificate of airworthiness under 
the experimental category [14].  These approvals 
include limitations which restrict UAS operations 
to within line of sight of an observer, within 
daylight hours, and away from other aircraft and 
populated areas.  Such restrictions pose a 
significant challenge to the broader civil U.S. UAS 
industry. 
The current management approach can only be 
a temporary solution put in place to accommodate 
the growing number of UAS.  There is much effort 
being directed towards the definition of a 
prescriptive framework of regulations and 
standards for UAS technologies.  These regulations 
should acknowledge that operational risk is a 
function of the UAS system design, the operation 
performed and the specific environment it operates 
in.   
For conventional human-piloted aviation the 
primary hazards, and the subsequent drivers for 
regulations, are those which present a risk to people 
onboard the aircraft [5, 15].  Consequently, the 
required level of dependability for aircraft design is 
primarily a function of the number of seats onboard 
the aircraft and is largely considered independent 
of the operation performed [16].  This approach 
may not be applicable for all UAS systems and 
operations because the primary risks transfer to 
people on the ground.  Assessment of risk becomes 
a function of both the operating environment and 
the UAS design being operated.  While a high level 
of system reliability may inherently address the 
risks to people and property on the ground, in many 
potential UAS concepts of operation, such 
reliability may be unnecessary.  In some cases the 
necessary degree of system reliability may not be 
driven by risk to the population at large at all, but 
instead by the cost of system attrition.  This is 
particularly the case for small UAS or for UAS 
operations in remote areas where public ground-
based risk would be almost negligible.  Thus 
characterising the complexity of the risk function 
will be essential to the definition of effective 
regulations and standards for UAS. 
 
The Problem 
 
As it stands, UAS stakeholders lack the tools 
necessary to make appropriate assessments of the 
systems, the operations they perform and the 
effectiveness of the protective measures put in 
place.  As a direct consequence, it is difficult to 
ascertain whether these measures are over or under 
prescribed and it is difficult to ensure that such 
measures are systematically applied.  In addition, 
the management activity is a resource intensive 
process for both the operator and the regulator.  
The lack of a fundamental knowledge about such 
risks will also undermine not only the foundation 
but also the practicality of future regulations. 
System designs are characterised by a multi-
dimensional problem space whose complexity is 
specified by often multiple and competing goals, 
by the constraints on the design and by the upper 
and lower bounds on performance measures.  
Physical constraints are hard and immutable 
whereas other softer constraints may be flexible 
and negotiable.  In the early stages of design the 
understanding of such constraints and bounds may 
lie in the realm of stakeholder desires (aspiration 
space) rather than that of reality and feasibility (the 
design space) [17]. 
Currently, the decision space for UAS risk is 
formed only by the varying and sometimes contrary 
perceptions and judgments of the individual 
stakeholders, a scenario not conducive toward 
coherent and effective decision making.  
Testimonies to the ramifications of this are the 
precautionary restrictions currently in place and the 
issues relating to obtaining insurance for civil 
operations.   
In the absence of obtaining knowledge through 
operational experience (a case of the chicken and 
the egg) other means are required to inform 
decision making.  
 
The Solution 
 
In accordance with accepted risk management 
practices [18], a key step is the completion of a 
detailed assessment of the risks.  In a general sense, 
this step should be completed to ensure that the 
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risks are identified, characterised (quantitatively or 
qualitatively) and evaluated before decisions are 
made on how best to manage them.  More 
specifically to UAS, such assessments are needed 
to identify the important factors influencing the 
risks.  This information should then be used to 
refine current practices and to guide the 
development of future standards. 
The primary objective of this program of 
research is to provide UAS stakeholders the 
necessary knowledge to make informed decisions 
with respect to the risks UAS operations present to 
people and property on the ground.  The formal 
analysis will investigate the importance of different 
factors, such as platform configuration, level of 
automation, flight profiles and operations, and will 
provide insight into the effectiveness of both 
operational and technology-based mitigation 
strategies.  This information can then be used to 
establish rational boundaries on the risk decision 
space, thus ensuring decisions are guided by 
objective knowledge as to the design space as 
opposed to perception and subjective judgement 
that may claim performance that is not feasible or 
aspirations that are not realistic. 
 
 
Development Of A Risk Analysis 
Framework 
 
Risk analysis is defined as “the systematic process 
to understand the nature of and to deduce the level 
of risk” [18].  A risk analysis is typically an 
analytical process which qualitatively or 
quantitatively calculates the likelihoods and 
consequences of a hazardous event.  Analysts must 
rely on risk models due to the absence of accident 
data from which to empirically characterise the 
hazard of UAS operations with any statistical 
significance.  This section discusses the 
development and challenges of the risk modelling 
task. 
 
The Modelling Problem 
 
At the highest level, and under the existing FAA 
definition of a hazardous event (fatal injury to 
ground personnel and/or general public [19]), an 
unrecoverable flight critical event constitutes a 
hazardous event given that there is a risk presented 
to human life. 
 
 
Equation 1 
Where: 
 
Pr(HE) = Probability of a Hazardous Event (HE) 
 
Pr(HE|UFCE) = Probability of a HE given an 
Unrecoverable Flight-Critical Event (UFCE). This 
is the conditional probability that an undesired 
descent constitutes a hazardous event.  
 
Pr(UFCE) = Probability of a UFCE occurs at a 
particular point in space and time.  This is 
indicative of the undesired descent rate. 
 
For conventional human-piloted aviation, the 
conditional probability given above approximates 
one.  This is because an undesired descent will 
always present a risk to the inhabitants of the 
aircraft: 
Pr(HE | UFCE) ≈  1 
 
Equation 2 
 
Therefore, for conventional human-piloted aviation  
Equation 1 can be rewritten as: 
 
Pr(HE)  ≈  Pr(UFCE) 
 
Equation 3 
 
Thus risk management strategies for 
conventional human-piloted aviation have focussed 
on minimising the likelihood of an unrecoverable 
flight critical event occurring.   
For UAS an undesired descent does not 
necessarily constitute a hazardous event [5, 15, 20].  
The conditional probability is a function of the 
number of people and property exposed on the 
ground which is specific to the operating 
environment and not just the UAS system.  For 
UAS operations over inhabited areas, Equation 1 
can be re-written as: 
 
Pr(HE) = Pr(C | I) x Pr(I | UFCE) x Pr(UFCE) 
 
Equation 4 
 
Where: 
 
Pr(C | I) = Conditional probability of a Casualty 
(C) given an Impact in an inhabited area (I). 
 
Pr(I |UFCE) = Conditional probability of an 
Impact in an inhabited area (I) given an 
Unrecoverable Flight-Critical Event (UFCE).  
 
There are three components to modelling the 
high level relationship described by Equation 4. 
The first component, Pr(UFCE), is the 
characterisation of the likelihood that at a particular 
point in time and space and under certain 
conditions (operational and environmental) the 
UAS experiences an unrecoverable flight critical 
event.  The second component is modelling the 
conditional probability that this event results in an 
impact in an inhabited area, Pr(I|UFCE).  The final 
Pr(HE) =Pr(HE | UFCE) x Pr(UFCE) 
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component to the high level model is the 
conditional probability that certain magnitudes of 
consequence are observed given a mishap for a 
particular impact location and time, Pr(C | I).  The 
three components of the modelling problem are 
illustrated as a consequence tree in Figure 1. 
Modelling the probability of a flight critical 
failure occurring at a given point in space and time 
is a complex task.  The traditional approach used in 
the aviation industry to model the failure rate of the 
system is to employ Probabilistic Risk Assessments 
(PRAs).  PRA techniques were developed to 
estimate the frequency of events in complex 
systems where incident data are scarce [21].  PRA 
techniques (such as those detailed in SAE ARP-
4761 [22]) have a strong footing in the assessment 
of aviation, nuclear and other technological 
systems.  However, there are a number of 
limitations in the use of PRA techniques.  One of 
which is the difficulty in addressing human factors 
[21].  A study conducted by the U.S Department of 
Defense, revealed that 17% of Class A mishaps for 
Defense operated UAS could be attributed to 
human factors [6, 7].  For the Predator series of 
UAS, human factors were cited as a contributing 
factor in 67% of recorded accidents [9].  The 
influence of the “operational/corporate 
environment” is also difficult to incorporate in a 
PRA [21].  PRA are thus more useful in modelling 
failures in the physical system.  More difficult to 
model will be those failures which are related to 
human factors, failures due to latent errors 
(particularly in software or mission planning), and 
those due to procedural (e.g. maintenance and 
operational) or environmental factors (e.g. 
hazardous weather conditions). 
The second component of the modelling task is 
determining the likelihood that an impact occurs in 
an inhabited area.  When and where the air vehicle 
impacts the ground depends on the trajectory of the 
airborne platform under the failure conditions.  The 
actual flight trajectory will depend on: 
1. The kinematics of the airborne platform under 
the particular failure mode,  
2. The initial conditions (state vector),  
3. The performance of the platform (range, max 
glide etc),  
4. External/environmental factors (e.g. wind),  
5. The level of operator and autonomous control 
over the trajectory of the platform (controlled, 
degraded or uncontrolled which is also a 
function of communications availability),  
6. Whether mitigation strategies are employed 
(such as a parachute system) and 
7. Underlying terrain (mountain ranges etc). 
These factors will all influence when and 
where an impact will occur under a given failure 
mode.  
The final component to the modelling problem 
is to determine the likelihood of observing a certain 
magnitudes of consequences as a result of a mishap 
at a given point in space and time.  This is 
primarily a function of the impact mode (e.g. 
gliding, vertical or debris field), distribution of the 
value at risk (e.g. people) and the ability of the 
airborne platform to impart damage to the object at 
risk (e.g. kinetic energy).  
 
 
 
Figure 1 – Consequence Tree Diagram for the Hazard of Discontinued Flight
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Challenges 
 
One of the most significant challenges facing the 
risk analysis of any complex and/or rare event is 
addressing the uncertainty in the model.  
Uncertainty is concerned with the true nature or 
state of the system [23, 24].  Specifically, how 
closely the results obtained from the use of 
particular stochastic models, data or assumptions 
correctly portray the true behaviour of the system 
(or in this case the hazards) being modelled. 
Decision makers must have a high degree of 
confidence in the modelling approach employed 
before the results are of any use in the decision 
making process.  Model verification and validation 
becomes an essential component of the risk 
analysis process.  Due to the rarity of the hazardous 
events under analysis it is “virtually impossible” 
[25] to experimentally confirm models.  For such 
rare events there is no substantial body of data 
which can be used to validate the model and even if 
there was, it is highly unlikely that there are a 
sufficient number of observations for statistical 
analysis to yield a high level of confidence in the 
results.  Addressing the uncertainties in the 
modelling process becomes a significant problem 
for the analyst. 
There are two forms of uncertainty in the 
modelling process, aleatory and epistemic [26].  
Aleatory uncertainty stems from the lack of data 
available to characterise the event with any 
substantial statistical certainty.  The stochastic 
variation in the model can be reduced with 
increasing data and repeated experimentation.  
Epistemic uncertainty arises from a lack of 
knowledge in the event or system being modelled 
[26].  This relates to whether or not all influencing 
factors have been identified and their relationships 
correctly modelled.  Epistemic uncertainty in the 
modelling process can only be reduced with 
ongoing operational experience and presents the 
greatest challenge to the risk modelling task. 
Key to addressing epistemic uncertainty in 
modelling is the level of transparency in the 
processes and assumptions made in the modelling 
process.  The impact of all assumptions should be 
thoroughly investigated and clear bounds need to 
be defined for the validity of the model over 
different input conditions. 
Communication is also vital to effective 
decision making [27].  The ability of the decision 
maker to comprehend the modelling approach and 
interpret the results will have an impact on the level 
of confidence they have in the risk analysis 
process.  Thus all assumptions and processes, 
including verification and validation, should be 
conveyed in a manner which is conducive to 
effective decision making. 
 
 
Case-Study Scenario 
 
An example case-study scenario is evaluated to 
illustrate how a simple risk analysis can be used to 
inform decision making.  The purpose of this 
section is not to critique the risk modelling 
approach presented but to illustrate the important 
role an objective assessment of the risks can play in 
the management of the risks of UAS operations.  
The case-study analysis will: 
1. Evaluate the risk profile for the given 
operation and identify high risk areas within 
this scenario where potential risk mitigation 
efforts should be directed.  
2. Evaluate the case-study operation against 
different ELOS casualty expectation criteria. 
 
The Case-Study Operation 
 
The case-study operation under analysis is for a 
UAS on approach to RAAF Base Edinburgh 
(YPED), Australia.  The approach to YPED was 
chosen as the case-study scenario because it has 
been used as the base for a number of UAS 
operations including the Northrop Grumman 
Global Hawk in 2001 [28] and the recent operation 
of a General Atomics Mariner [29].  The flight path 
is based on the route published in AIP-SUP H29/06 
[30] which was used in the recent flight trials of the 
Mariner UAS [29].  A standard 3° Instrument 
Landing System (ILS) approach path [31] was 
assumed for this analysis.  The flight path under 
evaluation is shown in Figure 2 as are the 
waypoints defined in the AIP [30]. 
The system under analysis is a generic UAS 
based on the physical specifications of the General 
Atomics Mariner.  The unrecoverable failure rate 
for the system was assumed as 1x10-05 per flight 
hour which is the overall failure rate objective for 
the Predator B series UAS [7].  It is likely that this 
mishap rate is over-optimistic for many UAS. 
 
The Risk Model 
 
A simple model is used to evaluate the expected 
number of casualties per flight hour of operation.  
The basic model is presented below in Equation 5 
and is similar to models used in [15, 20, 32-35]. 
 
CE = λ x PCasualty|Strike x PStrike|Impact x PImpact 
 
Equation 5 
Where: 
 
CE = Expected number of casualties per flight hour 
λ = Unrecoverable failure rate of the UAS per flight 
hour (1x10-05) 
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Figure 2 – Case-study Scenario: Approach to RAAF Base Edinburgh 
PCasualty|Strike = Conditional probability that a strike 
results in a casualty 
PStrike|Impact = Conditional probability that an impact 
at a specific location strikes a person 
PImpact = Probability of the platform impacting at a 
specific location 
 
The unrecoverable failure rate (λ) is assumed 
constant and thus independent of the mission, 
operating environment and any variations in time 
and space.  In reality, the failure rate of the system 
will vary and will depend on a wide range of 
influencing factors both internal (e.g. navigation 
system failure, human error, procedural error) and 
external to the system (e.g. extreme weather, bird 
strike).   
The probability of an impact at a specific 
location (PImpact) is indicative of the conditional 
probability presented in Equation 4.  For the 
purposes of this simple analysis it is assumed that 
the along track and across track distribution of an 
impact with the ground from a given failure 
location can be modelled as a bi-variate normal 
distribution.  The boundary for the spatial impact 
distribution is defined by the intersection of the 
maximum glide profile with the underlying terrain.  
The standard deviation for the along track 
distribution is derived based on the assumption that 
99% of all impacts will occur within the distance 
described by the maximum glide distance.  The 
standard deviation of the across track distribution is 
assumed half that of the along track distribution.  
This impact distribution is arbitrarily selected for 
the purposes of this analysis.  This distribution is 
not necessarily a good model for all likely failure 
scenarios.  Causal failure models coupled with a 
Monte Carlo simulator would provide a better 
indication of the impact distribution due to specific 
failure scenarios.  Such an approach would be 
computationally intensive and would require a 
failure model for each failure scenario under 
analysis.  However, the transparency of the causal 
modelling approach reduces the subjectivity and 
uncertainty in the risk analysis process.  The causal 
models also allow analysts to investigate the 
significance of individual causal factors on the 
resulting impact distribution.  This would facilitate 
the identification of key influencing factors and 
thus is a better modelling approach for guiding the 
development of operational and technological 
mitigation strategies. 
2001 Census data collected by the Australian 
Bureau of Statistics [36] was used to model the 
distribution of population in the operating 
environment.  The resolution of the population 
distribution is dependent on the size of the Census 
geographical collection districts.  The simple model 
used for calculating the conditional probability of 
striking a person at a given location (PStrike|Impact) is 
provided in Equation 6.   
 
PStrike|Impact = ρ x LA 
 
Equation 6 
Where: 
 
ρ = Density of population at the impact location. 
LA = Lethal area of the airborne platform in a 
gliding or vertical failure mode given below in 
Equation 7 and Equation 8 respectively.  The 
models used are similar to the lethal area model 
employed in [32]. 
 
10NM to threshold 
Waypoint 1 Waypoint 2 
Waypoint 3 
Degrees Longitude 
Degrees Latitude 
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LAGliding = (WAircraft + 2 x RPerson) x 
 (LAircraft + LGlideGround+ 2 x RPerson) 
 
 Equation 7 
And: 
 
LAVert = pi x ( ½ x  WAircraft + RPerson)2  
 
 Equation 8 
Where: 
 
WAircraft  = Width of the airborne platform, typically 
the wingspan 
RPerson = Radius of an average person 
LAircraft = Length of the airborne platform 
LGlideGround = The projected swath along the ground, 
given by the height of an average person divided by 
the sine of the glide angle. 
 
It is assumed that all people residing in the 
area are uniformly distributed.  The assumptions of 
a uniform and equally exposed population are over 
conservative.  More accurate population 
distribution models would need to calculate the 
proportion of people in different categories of 
structures and combine it with spatial information 
on the distribution of buildings, roadways and other 
categories of sheltering.  An example of a 
population model which utilises Census data to 
calculate the proportion of the population within 
certain categories of structures is provided in the 
risk analysis of the Columbia Space Shuttle re-
entry [37] and is based on the widely used Launch 
Risk Analysis model [38].  Spatial fusion 
algorithms could then be used to combine the 
distribution model with the spatial information on 
buildings and infrastructure. 
The conditional probability that a strike results 
in a casualty (PCasualty|Strike), coupled with the 
conditional probability of striking a person at a 
given location (PStrike|Impact) is representative of the 
exposure/consequence model as shown in Figure 
1.  The conditional probability that a strike results 
in a casualty (PCasualty|Strike) is assumed as one.  This 
is a relatively conservative assumption, particularly 
for smaller UAS.  A more accurate model would 
have to take into consideration the transfer of 
kinetic energy to the individual and the sheltering 
provided by structures.  An example of such 
models are those used in the risk analysis of the 
Columbia Space Shuttle re-entry [37], in the U.S. 
Range Commanders Council, Range Safety Criteria 
Assessments [39] and the Launch Risk Analysis 
model [38].  
It is important to note that the assumptions 
made in this model place a number of limitations 
on the use of the results obtained.  Firstly, the 
model is only indicative of those impacts due to 
system failure (i.e. propulsion system failure, 
catastrophic structural failure or power system 
failure etc) or any other failure which is likely to 
result in an impact within the region defined by the 
maximum gliding distance of the platform.  
External factors such as weather, the presence of 
other aircraft or birds are also not taken into 
consideration.  In addition, the model does not take 
into consideration mitigation systems (such as 
parachute recovery systems), emergency 
procedures (such as loss of link recovery plans etc) 
or any control actions made by a human operator or 
autonomous system.  Secondary hazardous events 
such as fire or the explosion of ordnance are not 
considered. 
 
Analysis One – Evaluation of Mission Profile 
 
For each waypoint in the flight path of the case-
study scenario, spatial contours of the individual 
risk and the casualty expectation (Equation 5) are 
evaluated.  Individual risk is the theoretical risk to 
an individual assumed to be residing at a specific 
point in space and time.  This figure is independent 
of the actual distribution of population and is 
calculated using Equation 5 assuming a single 
person is exposed (removing the population density 
by lethal area component).  An individual risk 
contour for an example waypoint in the case-study 
mission is depicted in Figure 3.  The contours 
show the spatial isopleths of individual casualty 
risk. 
Due to the simplifying assumptions made in 
the modelling process (i.e. PCasualty|Strike ≈ 1) the 
individual risk exposure is primarily a function of 
the unrecoverable failure rate of the system.  As 
can be seen in Figure 3, the contours resemble the 
assumed impact distribution of a bi-variate normal 
with an elongation along the direction of travel due 
to the assumed along-track and cross-track standard 
deviations.  The irregular boundary of this 
distribution is due to the elevation of the 
underlying terrain. 
 
 
 
Figure 3 – Example individual risk contour 
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The casualty expectation at a given location is 
calculated by multiplying the individual risk by the 
number of people exposed.  The number of people 
exposed is assumed equal to the lethal area 
multiplied by the population density (Equation 6).  
The boundaries of the ABS Census collection 
districts are shown beneath the risk contours in 
Figure 3.  Within each of these boundaries the 
population density is assumed uniform.  The 
resulting casualty expectation contour plot for the 
same mission point shown in Figure 3 is shown 
below in Figure 4.  The dependency of the casualty 
expectation contours on the underlying population 
distribution is evident in Figure 4. 
 
 
 
Figure 4 – Example casualty expectation contour 
 
The results obtained from the analysis of each 
point in the flight path of the case-study scenario 
are then aggregated for the entire mission.  The 
resulting maximum individual risk contour plot for 
the case-study flight path is shown in Figure 5. 
As can be seen from Figure 5 the primary 
areas of concern occur in regions surrounding the 
published 3° ILS approach path.  Areas on the 
ground surrounding the final approach to YPED are 
exposed to the highest levels of risk.   
As can be expected, the areas of highest 
casualty expectation were observed in the regions 
surrounding the final approach to YPED.  The 
casualty expectation is highest when the contours 
of higher individual risk coincide with regions of 
higher population density.  This is illustrated in 
Figure 6 which shows the casualty expectation and 
population density as a function of distance from 
the runway threshold at YPED, starting at the 10 
nautical mile point indicated in Figure 2 and 
Figure 5. 
As can be observed in Figure 6, the casualty 
expectation is highest when the individual risk 
contours intersect the areas of higher population 
density located between two and six nautical miles 
from the threshold.  Risk management strategies 
should thus focus on the minimisation of the risks 
along this phase of the operational scenario. 
One such operational risk management 
strategy would be to investigate a range of curved 
approach paths which avoid the direct over flight of 
the more populated regions.  Technology-based 
mitigation systems, such as a parachute system, 
could also be employed.  A parachute system 
reduces the size of the potential impact footprint 
and subsequently the number of people exposed.  A 
parachute system also reduces the kinetic energy of 
the aircraft.  A reduction in kinetic energy reduces 
the conditional probability that a strike results in a 
casualty (PCasualty|Strike) and reduces the likelihood of 
causing significant damage to property. 
 
 
 
Figure 5 – Individual risk contour plot for the entire case-study scenario 
10NM to threshold 
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Figure 6 – Expected number of casualties per flight hour (blue) and population density (green) as a function of 
distance along track from runway threshold 
 
As demonstrated in this example, such analysis 
is useful in the identification of high risk phases of 
a mission and thus facilitates the more efficient 
allocation of mitigation resources.  Such 
quantitative analysis also allows operators to 
optimise mitigation strategies (such as curved 
approaches) for a given risk exposure.  This simple 
case-study analysis has highlighted the usefulness 
of quantitative risk analysis as a strategic risk 
management tool. 
 
Analysis Two – Impact of Different ELOS 
Casualty Expectation Requirements 
 
The simple risk model developed can also be used 
to investigate the impact of safety standards on the 
case scenario.   
Currently there are no universally accepted 
standards describing the Equivalent Level of Safety 
(ELOS) requirement for UAS [34].  Casualty 
expectation is a commonly used measure of risk 
and thus could be used as a metric to describe the 
ELOS requirement.   
A casualty expectation limit of 1x10-06 per 
flight hour has been proposed as the ELOS baseline 
for UAS [1, 32].  Clothier et al. determined another 
casualty expectation criteria of 7.6x10-08 per flight 
hour which was calculated based on a review of 
involuntary ground fatality accident data recorded 
for conventional human-piloted aviation [34].  This 
paper does not propose the use of a casualty 
expectation as a sole metric to describe the ELOS 
requirement.  There are a number of important 
issues in the definition and application of such 
metrics which are discussed in detail in [34].   
An analysis was conducted to evaluate the 
impact a theoretical casualty expectation ELOS 
requirement could have on the case-study scenario.  
The case-study scenario was evaluated against four 
ELOS criteria: 
 
1. The commonly used standard; 1x10-06 [1, 32] 
2. That determined by historical involuntary 
ground fatality accident analysis for all 
conventional human-piloted aircraft 
operations; 7.6x10-08 [34]  
3. That determined by historical involuntary 
ground fatality accident analysis for 
conventional human-piloted air carrier 
operations; 3.13x10-08 [34] 
4. The arbitrary value of 1x10-09 
 
The analysis identified regions on the ground 
which exceeded or came within one order of 
magnitude of each of the ELOS requirements listed 
above.  The analysis revealed that the case-study 
scenario did not present a significant level of risk to 
people on the ground.  No region on the ground 
was exposed to a level of risk greater than 3.13x10-
08
 expected casualties per flight hour (the current 
historical casualty expectation rate observed for air 
carrier operations [34]).  Only 0.03% of the 
potential operating area exceeded the most 
stringent ELOS casualty expectation requirement 
of 1x10-09 casualties per flight hour.  These regions 
are indicated by the areas shaded black in Figure 7.  
The areas shaded in light orange indicate those 
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regions on the ground potentially exposed to a 
casualty expectation level within one order of 
magnitude of the 1x10-09 requirement.  These 
regions represent 0.33% of the total operating area 
of approx 3600 km2.   
As can be seen in Figure 7, the few regions 
exposed to a level above the 1x10-09 requirement 
were concentrated along the approach path.  These 
regions coincide with the more densely populated 
areas located approximately two to six nautical 
miles from the runway threshold along the 
published ILS approach path. 
The 1x10-09 requirement is more than an order 
of magnitude less than the historical safety 
performance recorded for conventional human-
piloted air carrier operations.  Thus the case-study 
scenario more than satisfies the requirement for an 
ELOS.  However, it is important to note that UAS 
may be required to demonstrate superior levels of 
safety to that of conventional human-piloted 
aviation in order to satisfy the demands of the 
public.  The public’s acceptance of the risks due to 
the operation of UAS is a complex function of their 
knowledge and awareness of the risks and benefits 
attributed to the technology [34].  At this point in 
time these expectations have not been quantified.  
Therefore, despite exhibiting a superior level of 
safety, it is not possible to say whether the level of 
casualty risk observed for the case-study scenario 
would be acceptable to the general public. 
 
 
Summary 
 
The objective of this paper was to establish the 
need for informed decision making in the risk 
management of UAS.  A simple risk model was 
developed and was applied to a practical case-study 
scenario.  Despite the obvious limitations in the 
model, the analysis did illustrate the important role 
risk analysis can play in decision making.  The 
analysis revealed areas of higher relative risk in the 
case-study scenario which could be used to guide 
mitigation strategies.  The analysis also determined 
that the level of casualty expectation was more than 
an order of magnitude less than that currently 
observed for conventional human-piloted air carrier 
operations.  Thus the need for further risk 
management of the case-study scenario may be 
unnecessary. 
 
Research Direction 
 
The primary objective of this program of research 
is to provide UAS decision makers with the tools 
necessary to make informed decisions with respect 
to the risk of UAS operations over inhabited areas.  
The research endeavours to achieve this by 
developing and implementing a formal risk 
analysis framework.  This framework will be based 
on the same high level modelling concept presented 
in this paper and will incorporate many of the 
refinements mentioned.   
 
 
 
Figure 7 – Regions on the ground where the proposed ELOS requirement of 1x10-9 is exceeded (black) or 
within one order of magnitude (orange) 
Flight path 
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These refinements include the development of 
a Monte Carlo simulator to evaluate the causal 
flight path, environment and failure mode models.  
Uncertainty in these models will be propagated 
through the simulation.  The conditions of 
operational validity for the risk analysis framework 
will be established by completing a sensitivity 
analysis of input factors and through a thorough 
analysis of the impact of assumptions made in the 
modelling process.  Once a suitable framework has 
been developed, verified and there is confidence in 
its validity, the framework will be used to 
investigate the key factors influencing the risk of 
UAS operations over inhabited areas. 
The knowledge gained from this analysis could 
be used to guide the definition of regulations and 
standards, and to evaluate the effectiveness of 
existing or proposed mitigation strategies.  The 
framework could also be used to gauge the impact 
policy may have on specific UAS applications or 
systems.  The research will also explore the 
potential application of the risk analysis framework 
into strategic and tactical risk management tools 
such as mission planning or real-time decision aid 
systems.  
The framework will be developed with the 
decision maker in mind, focussing on the 
transparency, validity and communication of the 
approach and results.  Such a focus is necessary if 
decision makers are to have confidence in the 
accuracy and integrity of the information provided. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Currently, the decision space for UAS risk is 
formed only by the varying and sometimes contrary 
perceptions and judgments of the individual 
stakeholders, a scenario not conducive toward 
coherent and effective decision making.  Realistic 
and objective boundaries on the decision space 
need to be established to ensure the effective 
management of the risks.  A formal risk analysis 
can provide the objective information required to 
establish these boundaries.   
A formal risk analysis framework would serve 
as a valuable tool to UAS stakeholders, providing 
the necessary information to guide decision 
making.  This in turn will give stakeholders 
confidence that mandated regulations and standards 
provide the necessary level of safety to the general 
public and that these policies do not come at the 
unjustified expense of the industry. 
The simplistic model and case-study scenario 
presented in this paper illustrate the effectiveness 
of risk analysis tools as an aid to decision making.  
However, there is still much work to be done in the 
development of a formal risk analysis framework 
for UAS operations, particularly in addressing 
uncertainty in the simulation and modelling 
processes.  On completion of this program of 
research, UAS stakeholders will be provided with 
the tools necessary to make informed decisions 
with respect to the risks presented to people and 
property on the ground.  These tools will play an 
important role in the development of future risk 
management policies and ultimately the realisation 
of a safe yet thriving UAS industry. 
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